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INTRODUCTION

The Alliance for Progress appears to falter within its

own objectives.

As such this is not unique to this aid

program; other programs have encountered difficulties in
their operation.

However, the extent of the Alliance's

failure to meet its stated goals raises the question of the

efficacy of the program itself and, what is more significant,
of the intent of the Alliance as a program of aid and as a

tool for reform.

In fact, the operational or mechanical

difficulties per se are not surprising considering the
obstacles Involved.

Traditionally divergent economic and

political patterns and social attitudes, here in the United
States and south of the "border," make it understandable

that diffipulties should be encountered in the implementation
of the program.

But technical problems can be solved,

given the required willingness on both sides and the subsequent
development of appropriate approaches and plans.
In fairness to the Alliance and to its main creator,

the

late President Kennedy, it must be noted that this program

does emphasize an important if not essential factor, which so
far had hardly been considered either by the Latin American

countries, or by the United States;

that of social reform.1

Moreover, it must be recognized that President Kennedy might
have had sincere and straightforward motives when he

inaugurated the program.

In line with this, we may rationalize

that the Alliance has lost its initial optimism since the

President's untimely death, thus resulting in the near-

stagnant situation of today, a situation which is suggested
by the mysterious silence of the nation's papers on this
subject over the last several yeaars.

Even allowing for the above assumption in defense of

the program, the fact still remains that the Alliance for
Progress is not fulfilling the hopes it had generated, nor
does it seem probable that it will do so in the near future.
There seems present an apathy which can hardly be promising
of increased activity and much needed efficiency.

The bright

goals of improved conditions and of a meaningful measure of
hope, as initially announced, appear ever more distant.
Critics of the Alliance are often told that they cannot

expect too much too soon, that time is needed for results to
show.

This is true.

Much criticism is based on impatience.

But it is not only the lack of results that concerns us here.
It is a number of attitudes and irregularities which need an

explanation and a justification beyond the mere consideration
of the difficulties presented by the Latin American situation.
The factors involved in causing the overall difficulties in

realizing the goals of the program are numerous, and more
often thatn not, they are inter-related.

While no one factor

can be singled out as the principal cause of the program»s

lack of success, the historical, geographic, economic and

political context within which the program operates and the
unorthodox implementation of it to date,

seem to suggest

certain specific, if "unofficial," reasons for the program
to exist.

These reasons obviously are not to be found in

print, either in the Charter of the Alliance or in any
other official document.

Yet, they cannot be dismissed on

that basis since their possible existence would alter the
meaning of the Alliance and explain many of the questions
surrounding it.

This paper, then, will attempt to analyze the program.
It will attempt to discover the motives and attitudes behind
its foundation and creation.

That is, it poses the question

whether the Alliance for Progress was instituted for the
reasons officially stated, or wether it was actually insti

tuted as a continuation of past policies, dictated by
unfounded chronic fears and limited outlooks, rather than by

a realistic appraisal of the problems at hand and by a longrange vision of the benefits which would result from their
solution.

CHAPTER I

THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS:
THE OFFICIAL PROGRAM AND ITS ACCEPTANCE

Latin America's obvious need for economic assistance

and social development had been recognized and indicated
before the advent of the Alliance for Progress.

A significant

example of this was Operation Pan America, suggested in 1958
by the then president of Brazil, Juscelino Kubitscheck.

This proposal, however, was not acceptable to the United

States, and thus was not acted upon.

The Fund for Social

Investment of the Act of Bogota of i960, reflecting the need
spelled out in Operation Pan America, on the other hand
was given concrete form by a 500 million dollar allotment.

The money, however, was never appropriated.

During the Inter-

American Economic and Social Conference held at Punta del

Este, Uruguay, the Charter of Punta del Este was signed by
the members of the Organization of American States on

August 17, 1961, establishing the Alliance for Progress.

This

Alliance had been proposed by President Kennedy during an
address to Latin American ambassadors convened for that

purpose at the White House on March 13, 196l.
With the Alliance for Progress, President Kennedy proposed
an unprecedented program of aid, far reaching in its ultimate

scope.

At leas^t, this is the impression offered by the

declaration of Punta del Este.

To quote the Charter:

"It is the purpose of the Alliance for Progress ... to
accelerate the economic and social development of the par

ticipating countries of Latin America, to achieve maximum

levels of well-being. . . ."2 The Charter further enumerates
the following fundamental goals to be achieved within the
coming decade:

1.

"To achieve ... a substantial and sustained

growth of per capita income, ... to attain levels of income

capable of assuring self-sustaining development,.. . . to
reach these objectives . . . the rate of economic growth . . .
should be no less than 2.5$ per capita per year. ..."

2.

"To make the benefits of economic progress available

to all citizens of all economic and social groups through

a more equitable distribution of national income. ..."

3.

"To achieve balanced diversification in national

economic structures, both regional and functional, making

them increasingly free from dependence on the export of a
limited number of primary products.

k.

..."

"To acceleate the process of rational industrialization,

. . . special attention should be given to the establishment
and development of capital goods industries."

5.

"To raise agricultural productivity and output. ..."

6.

"To encourage . . . programs of comprehensive

agrarian reform leading to the effective transformation . . .
5

of unjust structures and systems of land tenure and use. . ..."

7.

"To eliminate adult illiteracy, ... to provide

the competent personnel required in rapidly growing societies."
8.

"To increase life expectancy at birth,

... to

increase the ability to learn and produce. ..."

9.

"To increase construction of low-cost houses. ..."

10.

"To maintain stable price levels, avoiding inflation

or deflation.

11.

"To strengthen existing agreements on economic

integration.

12.

..."

..."

"/Tyb prevent the harmful effects of excessive

fluctuations in the foreign exchange earnings derived from
exports of primary products, ... to facilitate the access

of Latin American exports to international markets."-^
The framers of the Charter, in order to provide some

practical guidance to the process of achieving the objectives
listed above, emphasize that certain principles should be
taken into account.

These principles, considered necessary

to the effectiveness of the program, should be basic to the

program's undertakings and simultaneously reenforce the
objectives themselves.

The principles, as stated in the

Charter, are:

1.

The participating nations should prepare programs

of economic and social development on a national basis.

2.

These programs should be based on and carried out

according to democratic principles.

3.

Women should be placed on an equal footing with

men, to provide them with the dignity they deserve and to
best utilize their potential contribution to the nation*s
well-being.

4.

Sufficient external financial assistance should be

obtained to realize the goals of the Alliance.

(The Charter

here states that at least 20 billion dollars should be made

abailable from all sources over a ten year period. )
5.

Finally, the institutions of each nation, both in

the private and in the public sectors, should be strengthened

and improved, in order to increase their effectiveness.
The purpose of the program, then, is to accelerate

economic progress and to achieve social Justice in the Latin
American countries through massive financial aid from the

United States coupled with the principle of self-help, meaning
the matching efforts of the Latin American nations themselves.
In the relatively short time of ten years, the Alliance
proposes to bring about large-scale changes to better the
conditions, to realize the hopes, and to provide the wellbeing of millions of people who otherwise might never see
the possibility of progress of any sort.

According to the directives of the program, a nation

desiring assistance must carry out studies of the need, type
and scope of long-term development.

The resulting program

of development, requiring outside assistance, is then submitted
to a panel of nine high-level experts, appointed by the InterAmerican Economic and Social Council.

and evaluates the proposed plan.

This committee analyzes

Should it deserve recom

mendation for further action, the committee reports it to

the Inter-American Development Bank (the United States agency

controlling the finances of the Alliance), which in turn
will analyze and evaluate it and, if approving the plan,

proceed with arranging of the necessary finances to carry it
out.

Then the program moves into the field for actual

implementation.
In addition to the financial agency mentioned in the

procedure described above, the Charter recommends that sources
of financial and technical aid other than the United States

be considered and used for providing assistance to the requesting
nations.

The Organization of American States, the United

Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, and other

specialized agencies of the United Nations are mentioned in
particular.
The Alliance for Progress thus provides an unusually

large source of funds, while at the same time demanding the
active involvement of the participating nations, mainly in the

form of local reforms (for example of tax and agrarian

systems), and in the preplanning of their economic and social
innovations.

Considering the difficulties of the Latin American
countries to raise capital funds for investment in their
economic structures, due to their present low-level of savings,

the acceptance of this promising program was understandably
favorable.

In the words of Tad Szulc:

"Latin America1s

first reactions to President Kennedy's inauguration and to

his March speech on the Alliance were enthusiastic.

. . .

President Kennedy was described in emotional editorials and

speeches as spiritual heir of Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose
legend still lives throughout Latin America.

The Kennedy

election presaged a new and better era of Good Neighbor

policies, Latin American writers declared in their newspapers."5
Commenting on the North American reactions, Szulc continues:

"Enthusiastic support for the Alliance did come from Washington,
both in the idealistic speeches by President Kennedy and in
the more tangible earmarking of substantial funds for Latin
America's social and economic development along paths never
tried before by the United States alone or in cooperation

with the region.""

The editors of the New York Times,

commenting on the President's speech of March 13, and noting
the social aims of the Alliance, stated:

"Our policies for

150 years have been with these /Latin American/ ruling classes
9

and not for the people of Latin America."'

They went on to

say that if the policies set forth in the President's program
were carried out, then the United States would not lose the
Cold War in Latin America.

In the issue describing the

final day of the Punta del Este conference, the New York

Times reported that the delegates of both the United States
and Latin America referred to the Alliance as "a turning
o

point in the history of the Americas."

The conference

itself was permeated by a "spirit of resolve," and the
delegates defined the conference as %

complete success."

The editors of the New Republic, while cautioning against
the difficulties ahead, called the program "encouraging,"

and the principles emphasized in it as the basis and funda

mental guidelines for the Alliance as "excellent,"9
President Jose Figueres, of Costa Rica, stated:

Former

"There can

be no doubt that the United States is ready to assume the

leadership that history has conferred on it."

10

Thus the level of acceptance was generally favorable
both in the United States and in Latin America at the time

the Alliance was announced and officially constituted.

there were also voices of skepticism.

11

But

These no doubt

reflected the long standing diffidence of the weaker nations
of Latin America towards the mighty neighbor of the North,

and perhaps they anticipated what was to come.

10

Perhaps they

felt already then that the program's noble goals were not

politically or economically realistic nor feasible within
the period given.

Perhaps this early realization on their

part caused their later lack of enthusiasm, which the United
States today, as a nation, still refuses to comprehend or
to appreciate.

11

CHAPTER II

THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IN ACTION

Before evaluating the Alliance for Progress itself

and drawing any conclusions as to its political implications,
it will be useful to present a more asretiraltee description of

the program so that a better understanding of it may be
obtained.

The Alliance for Progress has certain objectives stated
in its Charter.

To achieve these objectives, the United

States assigns certain amounts of financial aid on a yearly

basis.

This chapter will examine the sums of money provided

in order to establish the extent of these in relation to

the problems faced by the Alliance, and to establish whether
the means available to the Alliance are sufficient or not to

accomplish its goals.

Some of the merits then, and some of

the shortcomings of the Alliance will be the topic of this
chapter.

A.

Extent of the Alliance for Progress

Judging the overall program, there is no denying that
the Alliance for Progress is the greatest effort ever attempted

to produce change In Latin America,

The twelve objectives

listed in the Charter and the five accompanying principles

12

constitute the most comprehensive blueprint ever devised for
the needs of the region.

As has been noted earlier, special

emphasis is being given to a most sensitive and heretofore
rather overlooked area, that of social development.

With

this program the needs of the people, of the masses at the
lower socio-economic level, are finally recognized.

The

people—any nation's major asset—are included in the total
picture of concern; they are seen as a factor deserving
serious attention from the promotors of reform.

Traditionally

only the aspects of economic deficiency were recognized and
dealt with.

A particular merit of the Alliance for Progress is to
have this double objective.

It attempts to cure the problems

of an economic nature as well as those of a purely social

nature.

Rather than focusing on one only, the Alliance

operates in both fields, and it does so simultaneously.

Thus,

ideally speaking at least, the Alliance avoids overstressing
one area of activity at the expense of the other, as has been
the case so many times in the past.

If we lbok at Russia,

for example, and at the decades immediately following the
Revolution of 1917, we can see at what immense cost the
Industrialization of that country was accomplished, in terms

of human sacrifice, physical suffering and all-around

deprivation.

If in Latin America we proceed on the assumption

that progress is desirable, in fact needed, and if it is also
13

desirable that violence and suffering be avoided, it then
seems rather obvious that the emphasis on social development,

coupled by equal emphasis on economic progress, is a highly
justified and legitimate approach.

From the financial aspect alone, the extent of aid

provided by the Alliance for Progress is unprecedented.

It

is common knowledge that the United States concentrated its

foreign aid efforts in the years following World War II on
the rehabilitation of Western Europe, especially through

such programs as the successful European Recovery Program.
The urgency of massive economic assistance to Western Europe
during those politically dangerous years is not argued here.
However, it remains true that Latin America received little
attention at the time from its northern neighbor, even though
then it deserved and needed attention as much as it does now.

In fiscal year i960, for example, the year preceeding
the Alliance, the United States provided only 189 million
dollars of foreign aid to all of the Latin American nations.

But in 1961, with the advent of the Alliance for Progress,
the amount of foreign aid Increased to over 700 million

dollars.12

The table below shows the expenditures of United

States funds under the Alliance for the years indicated.

This sudden increase obviously does reflect a greater

awareness on the part of the United States of the growing
problems existing in Latin America.
1^

At the same time, it

TABLE I

NET DISBURSEMENT OF AID13
(In Millions of Dollars)
Fiscal Year

Aid Disbursed

1963
196^

576
W*7

_12hl

612

seems to indicate, in support of that awareness, a deeper
committment of the United States towards the betterment of

the conditions in Latin America.

In conclusion,

it can

safely be said that the Alliance for Progress is the most

far-reaching and extensive aid program—both in purpose and
in the actual means provided—ever made available to Latin
America by either the United States or any other outside
source.

B.

Accomplishments of the Alliance for Progress

Looking at the positive side of the Alliance, there
are concrete results testifying to the active operation of

the Alliance during the few years of its existence.

According

to a report of the Inter American Economic and Social Council
evaluating the progress of the Alliance through the first
two years of its operation, a total of 1.2 billion dollars
had been expended.

This amount includes aid contributions

from all sources, of which about 1 billion dollars originated
from the United States.

In addition, the Inter American

15

Development Bank committed 400 million dollars during this
same period.

The Council's report goes on to indicate that

actual progress has been made in various fields.

Specifically,

it states that an 8% increase in manufacturing output has been

obtained, even though this increase is concentrated in the
more advanced nations, and a 2.5% increase has been obtained

in agricultural output.1** Unfortunately, the report is not
broken down in a more detailed measurement of the specific

progress realized in particular areas of endeavor.

Even

though the tone of the report is rather general, the huge

sums expended would tend to indicate that some progress must
have been made somewhere.

President Kennedy, observing the second anniversary of
the Alliance for Progress, gave some indication of real

accomplishments by enumerating a number of achievements
realized over the two year period.

According to the President,

140,000 new housing units had been built, a number of alum
clearance projects had been initiated, 8,200 new class rooms
had been constructed, 700 new water systems were in use,

land-reform and tax-reform programs had been adopted, 160,000
agricultural loans had been made and k million school books
had been distributed.

Moreover, 9 million children in 18

countries had been fed through the Food for Peace Program.

Other, but undetermined progress had been made in areas such
as common-market agreements, price of coffee stabilization
16

and road construction.15

Again, there is indication here

of concrete performance.

Yet,

it remains disturbing that no

specific figures are available to illustrate more clearly
how the vast sums of aid can be accounted for.

Nathan A. Haverstock, also evaluating the first two

years of the program, reports more or less the same

progress.1"

He adds that, by this time, all the nations of

Latin America, with the exception of Haiti, had, or were

preparing plans for social and economic development on a
nation-wide basis.

Of these national plans seven had been

approved or were being considered by the appointed committees

working under the supervision of the Organization of American
States.

In addition, Haverstock speaks of "encouraging

progress," but he too does not offer a more detailed report.

In fact, the ambiguity of his statements ("had or were
preparing," "seven programs had been approved or were being

considered"), suggests the attempt of offering an encouraging
picture where, in reality, it is probably not quite possible
for him to do so.

Victor L. Urquidl, evaluating the Alliance's progress
during the first two years, does not boast of any great
accomplishments.

On the contrary, this writer, more

sympathetic towards the program than most, asks that the
progress obtained so far be considered, and warns that

"enough time should be allowed to judge the results."1'
17

In 1964, measuring the three year effort, President
Johnson reported additional progress made possible through
the Alliance.

He stated that 900 credit unions had been

established, that 220,000 housing united had been built,
that 23,000 school rooms had been built, and that a number

(undetermined) of potable water systems had been made available.18
In the years following, we may well assume that further

progress has been made in Latin America and that such progress
might be credited to the Alliance for Progress.

However,

comprehensive reports on the Alliance's accomplishments
during the later years are lacking.

Little is available

from official sources, except the figures of total expenditures
which have already been noted.

These figures though, while

Impressive, are not indicative per se of what has been

achieved with the money they represent.

This might suggest

that something is seriously amiss with the operation of the
program and with its performance.

The fact that our newspapers

and magazines cannot offer a listing of completed projects
and of goals realized seems to confirm the suspicion that
the program is not as successful as the finances invested in
the effort would indicate.

If the goals and objectives of the Alliance for Progress
are not being reached, the conclusion can only be that the
Alliance is failing as an assistance program.

It is rather

obvious that if successes had been obtained, those parties
18

interested in the program, such as the United States
Government, would publicize those successes.

In the absence

of such information, the conclusion stated above must be

quite valid and certainly realistic.

The disappointing performance of the Alliance is due
to two specific factors.

One is the difficulties encountered

in the field while implementing the program.

These range

from simple misunderstandings to enmity, lack of cooperation,
friction, etc.

These may be defined as "mechanical" problems

which could easily be dealth with given the desire to do so.
Related to this, and to some extent the cause of it, is the
second factor which is the concept behind the Alliance

itself, the nature of which this paper attempts to identify.

This will be attempted in the following chapter, when
analysing the political implications of the Alliance.

C.

Sufficiency and Limitations of the
Alliance for Progress

Even though it cannot be denied that the Alliance for

Progress is the greatest effort yet attempted to correct the
ills of Latin America, it may still be reasonably asked:

Is

the Alliance sufficient in scope and means to deal with the

problems it wants to eliminate?

question is difficult to give.

A direct answer to this

After all, how can any

government or agency accurately list and measure the problems

19

of all the Latin American nations?

And beyond that, how can

a sum of money be fixed and declared to be the amount needed

for eliminating the causes which produce social injustice
and poverty in those nations?

Also, what standards are to

be used to measure and define the ills of the area?

Obviously, the answer to the first question can only
be a qualified one, but even so it tends to be negative.
If one considers that the population of Latin America is

about 200 million people and that the Alliance, ideally

speaking at least, offers 2 billion dollars of aid per year,
this would result at about 10 dollars of aid per capita
per year.

Admitting that this is not a valid evaluation of

the productive capacity of the aid supplied, it still seems

reasonably indicative of the relative insufficiency of the
program's means.

According to similar calculations, the

aid extended to Western Europe by the United States under

the Marshall Plan, came to about 9 dollars of aid per
capita per year for the program's duration.

Considering

the degree to which Western Europe was already industrialized
at the time of the Marshall Plan, the technical know-how and

the resources and skills at its disposal, the aid extended to

it was far greater in quantity than that extended today to

the underdeveloped and semi-stagnant nations of Latin America,

The #10 figure of aid per capita per year, moreover, is
20

arrived at on the assumption that #2 billion per year are
made available to Latin America.

As Table I indicates, this

is not the case and therefore the $10 figure is extremely
higher than the actual financial aid provided.

On this basis,

it is doubtful that the Alliance for Progress can be
successful with the means available to it and in the time

given.

Not only does Latin America lack the economic and

political infrastructure Western Europe had when assisted
by the United States, but at times the economies of Latin

America are regressive rather than progressive, due to the
population increase and to the fluctuations of prices on
the world markets.

The economies of Western Europe were

largely independent of outside influences; this is not true
of Latin America.

Finally, the cost of capital is increasing,

making it harder for the Latin Americans to raise the capital

they need for development and expansion, and therefore
making the goals of the Alliance quite unrealistic if not
impossible to obtain.
Thus, whereas the aims of the Alliance are undoubtedly
commendable, it seems that the means assigned to it to realize
its purposes are far from adequate.
The lack of sufficient funds with which to work auto

matically becomes the main limitation of the Alliance for

Progress.

In 1963# the then Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson
21

stated the case as follows:

Most important of these lessbctsj is the fact that, for
the job before us, our resources are not comfortably
abundant.
What we have to work with is enough if we
carefully and wisely use it to create the growth now

which will free the growth of the future.!9
The very ills of Latin America constitute a further
limitation to the success of the Alliance.

Latin America

lacks the skills, the facilities and the technicians to

implement the various projects of the Alliance.

For example,

Nathan A. Haverstock said that after two years seven plans

of national development had been approved or were being
considered.

It seems more correct to say that after two

years only seven such plans were being or had been approved.
This may indicate the lack and need of economists and other
technicians needed to prepare long-range development programs.

The consequences of the lack of technical personnel,
services, and facilities can be seen in the construction of

"Ciudad Techo," a brand new city near Bogota, Colombia.

(This is the low-cost housing project which was inaugurated

by President Kennedy in December, 1961.)

In 1962, services

such as sewers, water and electricity were lagging behind the
building program, causing the new city to quickly resemble
a slum area.

The slum atmosphere was reinforced by the lack

of commercial centers,

schools or social activity centers.

Much of the city, moreover, was built on a self-help basis.
This, for lack of adequate technical assistance and super22

vision, resulted in the construction of many shacks rather
than homes.

20

It is only fair to note, however, that these difficulties,

with time and patience, may be overcome if there are
available and sufficient means to deal with them.

But as

noted above, presently this is not the case.

D.

Present Response to the Alliance for Progress

The initial acceptance of the Alliance for Progress,
both in the United States and in Latin America, was quite
enthusiastic.

As the program progressed, however, attitudes

changed to the point that in many quarters the program is
regarded as yet another "gap-filler," rather than the ambitious
partnership which was to socially and economically revolutionize
the nations of Latin America.

Tad Szulc, in a comprehensive study of the Latin American
scene, notes the declining support given the Alliance, even

by those who most desperately need its help:
Likewise the Alliance has evoked no marked response
from the political leadership in the Hemisphere—
with the exception of the top governing levels in

such countries as Venezuela, Colombia (under the Lleras

Comargo regime), and Costa Rica, which have traditionally
been sympathetic to the notion of democratic social

revolution.
Most of the democratic parties in Latin
America have remained cool to the cooperative notion
of the Alliance, partly because of disbelief in its
future and partly because both the United States and
the Latin American governments have made no real
effort to relate the domestic problems and anxieties

23

in each country to the overall idea of a revolu
tionary partnership under the Alliance for

Progress.21
Miss Elva Calmette, a faculty member here at Western

Michigan University and a native of Peru, visits her country
every summer, giving her the opportunity to learn first
hand the effects of the Alliance.

She states that the

Alliance has long been considered a failure.
is that the Alliance

is

The attitude

seen as an extension of the

State

Department of the United States, and is therefore to be

distrusted.

In view of past inter-American relations, this

feeling is quite understandable.

But it also warns of the

difficulty of obtaining a positive response and active
cooperation if the basis is composed of justified diffidence
on one side, and ambiguity of purpose on the other.
Ex-President Juscelino Kubitscek of Brazil, after a

tour of Latin America, reported:

"I found an absolute lack

of faith in the Alliance and its results among the popular
classes."

In Chile Eduardo Frei stated:

simply inoperative."

"The Alliance was

In Colombia, a supporter of the Alliance,

ex-President Lleras Camargo, complained that:

"one cannot

see anywhere in Latin America the spirit of enthusiasm that
the Alliance requires."

found that the Alliance:

In Argentina the Foreign Minister

"remains suspended as a hope and

has not penetrated either as a mysticism or as a concrete

plan, although to be successful it must do both."22
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Comments from various leaders and officials in the

United States run much the same way, indicating that the

Alliance is now considered a great disappointment, if not

an outright failure.

expected too soon.

Again, it may be said that too much is

Yet five full years have passed since

the program was started.

Is it not legitimate then to ask

why the program is malfunctioning?

Should it be surprising

that the very concept of the Alliance and its motivations are

being questioned?

The next chapter will deal with these

questions and will attempt to analyze these motivations in
the light of the actual results and capabilities of the
Alliance for Progress and in the context of inter-American
relations.
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CHAPTER III

THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS AS ACCONTINUATION; OF
PAST POLICIES

Viewing the Alliance for Progress in the total context
of inter-American relations,

that is, within the framework

of geographic, political and economic conditions within
which it is contained,,the Alliance results as something
other than a mere act of charity.

It is not simply a gesture

of good will or the expression of a dedicated effort to provide
solid foundations to a vacillating continent.

It seems,

rather, that the ultimate and specific purpose of the
Alliance is to satisfy certain immediate interests of the

United States.

Thus the Alliance is not simply a means of

bringing well-being to the Latin American nations, but, by

providing Latin America with a "relative" level of well-being,
it emerges as a tool to guarantee and maintain the safety,
the security and the well-being of the United States.
This is neither a surprising nor uncommon notion in the

field of international politics.

As such, it is quite under

standable and expected for that matter.
similar, but not identical,

In fact, a concept

to that of the Alliance for

Progress was operative behind the Marshall Plan in respect
to the role of Europe vis-a-vis the United States. The

difference in the case of Western Europe is that Western
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Europe quickly regained its pre-war levels of economic
activity, and iri fact surpassed them, thus becoming selfsufficient, and consequently to a large extent non-dependent,
politically, upon a foreign power or any other outside
control.

However, in the case of Latin America, what is

disturbing is the fact that Latin America is not economically
self-sufficient, and,

therefore, largely dependent upon

foreign economic systems, mainly that of the United States.
The Alliance for Progress operates in this sphere of
economic and political dependency.

Considering the actual

extent of the program and noting that the United States is
its main sponsor, the Alliance for Progress appears to be

used by the United States only to that Extent required by
its own necessities.

For this reason the Alliance acquires

a suspect aura of deception which causes the program to
stumble upon the offended feelings of the Latin Americans,
and, therefore, to offer the opposition and the lack of
cooperation the Alliance now faces.

Sadly enough, because

of the Latin American response, many are quick to denounce
their "ingratitude," their "lack of political maturity,"
etc., as a consequence of which there follows much mis

understanding, friction, and ill-feelings on both sides.

At this point though, it may be well to clarify what
has been stated so far, to look at the Alliance in a more
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analytical manner, and to present a more organized discussion,

A.

Parallel between the Alliance for Progress
and Previous Inter-American Relations

The history of Inter-American relations presents a clear

pattern of United States' economic and political dominance
over the Latin American nations.

Perhaps it would be

incorrect to use the label of "imperialism" in defining the
Monroe Doctrine since there was no direct action involved, at

least not when it was announced, and since the doctrine Itself

was rathermgue in terms of its extent and limitations.

It

did not commit the United States to specific action, military

or otherwise, in case of European intrusion in the Latin
American area or in the northwestern area of our hemisphere,

even though in later years it was to be used to justify on
a "legal" basis our military and economic interventions.
But in remains true that it was a unilateral declaration,

that the concept was formulated and promulgated to safeguard
the security of the United States, and that the security of
the Latin American area resulted only as a by-product

(admittedly a positive one), of the doctrine's main purpose.
Even If political reality and pragmatism justified the above,

we must still realize that already in 1823 there was underway
that process of United States' disregard for the feelings of

sovereignty and of individual and national dignity of the Latin
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Americans, a process which today produces an anti-yankee
Castro or the nationalism of the proudly independent-minded
Mexicans.

The occupation of Cuba in 1898, justified only partly
as a move to liberate the Cubans from oppressive Spanish rule,

along with the occupation of Puerto Rico, Guam and the

Philippines, signaled the beginning of United States' active
intervention in the affairs of other nations, when such action

was deemed necessary to protect north American security and
interests.

Our assistance In the bloodless revolution of

Panama in 1903, which resulted in Colombia's loss of the
isthmus and in the construction of the canal so stratigically

important between the two oceans, our military intervention
in Nicaragua in 1912, our military intervention in Haiti in

1914, our intervention in Santo Domingo by treaty in 1905 and
militarily in 1916, and our more recent direct involvements
in the affairs of Guatemala, Cuba and again Santo Domingo,

are but an escalation of the pattern established in Cuba

in 1898.

The basis of justification, at first, was to

eliminate the menace of possible European intervention and,

later, to protect our interests from Latin American financial
incompetency.

Our occupation and excursion in Mexico

(Vera Cruz, 1914; Northern Mexico, 1916) were part of that
same urge for self-rprotection.

It should be noted in passing

that these military expeditions had a precedent in the
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similarly motivated Mexican War of 1846-48, even though

territorial conquest was the main issue then.2^
In addition to aur Interests in the sugar, banana,
copper and oil industries in the nations mentioned so far,
our interests in the oil industry of Venezuela and Colombia,

in precious metals in Central America and Peru, in copper
in Chile, and, until recently, in the rubber industry of
Brazil have made political pressure a very common aspect
of our past relations with the Latin Americans.

That this aspect of dominance and control was not
causal but intended, is evidenced by the inconsistency

of

the United States in recognizing the various changing
governments of Latin America.

The Obregon government of

Mexico, regularly elected in 1920,

for example, was not

recognized until 1923 as a result of an article of the

Mexican Constitution of 1917, restricting the activities of

foreign investors and denying their "right" of protection

from their own nations.2** After the military coup of 1962
in Peru,, the United States refused recognition of the new

government, only to recognize it some time later; it may be

significant that the United States in 1962 had well over

800 million dollars invested in Peru, and, therefore was

not too anxious to rock the boat. *
On the other hand, the United States is quick to recognize
those coups and governments which follow "unfriendly" or
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"uncooperative" ones.

This was the case in Argentina in 1962.

Jose Marfa Guido was recognized as head of the government,
even though he illegally succeeded President Frondizi, who
was forced out of power.
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Generally speaking then, the picture of Inter-American
relations cannot be said to be one of mutual respect or trust.

To the contrary, the economic interests of the United States,

especially of the extractive industries, have dictated a
policy of one-sided control and dominance to assure sufficient

political stability and an all-around favorable climate for
the establishment and development of North American economic
activities in Latin America.

If this has been the pattern in the past, a pattern

which persists today, as demonstrated by United States' control
of fully one-half of the Venezuelan oil industry, why then
should the Alliance for Progress be of a sudden and different

nature?2? In fact, how can the Alliance be different if its
very implementation must per force clash with United States'
economic interests in Latin America?
the United States call for a

How, in other words, can

social and economic reform in

Latin America, as the Charter of the Alliance would have it,
when the same United States practically has the power of life
and death over much of the area, and when it does not allow

this power to be altered or diminished?
The Alliance appears as an appeascrr to check the animosity
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of the Latin Americans and their increasing demands.

It has

been noted in the previous chapter that the Alliance for

Progress is a larger effort than ever attempted before.

This

is true, but this is also easily understandable if it is noted
that the problems and needs of Latin America are greater than
ever before.

For example, Latin America has the highest

rate of population increase in the world, and, thus, a growing
food problem.

In 1930 the population of Latin America was

108 million people.

In 1965 the population had increased to

243 million, at a rate of increase of 2.8$ per year.

Food

production, however, is not increasing at the same high rate.
At times, this rate is even regressive, as in Uruguay and
Brazil in recent years.

The per capita acreage of farming

land is low in Latin America which, in addition to the low-level

of farming mechanization, makes it very difficult for the
Latin Americans to maintain a progressively sufficient food

production.

To increase that production is a difficult task

indeed.

Moreover, there is a greater awareness in Latin America,
as in the rest of the world, of the potential availability
of modern facilities, of goods and gadgets.

The privileged

classes especially are aware of, and demand the commodities
produced by the technologically more advanced nations.

These

of course have to be imported, causing further stress on the

already precarious conditions of their balance of payments.
32

The less fortunate, unable to read but certainly able to see
the luxuries of the few, desire themselves such commodities

as they can afford.

Small transistor radios, for example,

are becoming more and more common.

Consequently, the need for foodstuffs and the demand

for goods from abroad is constantly increasing.

Similarly,

if the traditional degree of control is to be maintained over

the area by the United States, the "appeaser" must be
increased proportionately.
Another observation which may be made of the Alliance

derives from the timing of the program.

The Alliance for

Progress was instituted soon after the 1959 revolution of

Cuba.

Castro's movement aimed at restructuring the social

and economic edifice of his island.

This could only be done

by eliminating the traditional system, and replacing it by

a new and national system.

Thus, the Batista dictatorship

and the United States support making it possible had to be
and were sacrified in the process.

The result, as might be

expected, alienated the United States whose investments were

confiscated.

Yet Cuba needed outside help to survive and

rebuild; it needed markets, especially for its sugar.

It

seems then, that Castro had no other choice but to accept
the only offer of help available to him—that of Russia.
But in the United States Cuba was seen, and still is seen

today, as a menace to its security and to its protective,
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intervention-prone foreign policy, rather than as a local
effort of national affirmation and self-determination.

One may well conclude, then, that the Alliance is also a
reaction to the Cuban situation in order to avoid similar

occurrences elsewhere in Latin America.29 The fallacy of
such a reaction is that it tends to consider the symptoms

of the situation only.

It does not go back to the original

cause of the problem, a cause which cannot be cured by an X
number of dollars.

B.

Interdependence of the Economies of the
United States and Latin America

The fact that the United States has been, and is, an

industrial producer is quite obvious.

The United States is

fortunate to have many of the raw materials it needs to

maintain and to support its great industrial complex.

Those

raw materials available within the United States are not,

however, sufficient in quantity, nor do they include all of

the

types needed.

It Ms at least doubtful if the United

States could survive in total isolation and maintain the

same high levels of.productivity.

Certain foodstuffs and

certain mineral products must be imported from abroad.
Latin America plays an essential role in the economy of
the United States, as a supplier of these primary goods.
At the same time Latin America is also largely dependent upon
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the United States for its markets.

Asia and Africa lack

the buying power to function as viable markets.

Europe

tends to raise tarriff barriers and to grant privileged
conditions to its own ex-colonies,

America's producers.

thus exluding Latin

A comparison of the statistics below

illustrates Latin America's dependency upon the United
States, since almost 50 per cent of its total exports go
to the United States.

TABLE II

EXPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA TO THE WORLD30
(In Millions of Dollars)
1956

1960

1962

1963

1964

8,640

8,570

9,150

9,730

10,580

TABLE III

EXPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA TO THE UNITED STATES31
(In Millions of Dollars)
1955

1960

1962

1963

1964

3,607

3,961

3,928

4,018

4,148

Selling one's products on a single market is not
necessarily disadvantageous.

But Latin America's dependency

is aggravated furthermore by two additional factors.

One

is that the economy of Latin America is largely controlled
by United States' holding companies, which through their
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extensive financial control affect and influence the total
milieu of Latin American societies.

The table below lists

the direct private investments of the United States in
Latin America.

TABLE IV

UNITED STATES' INVESTMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA32
(In Millions of Dollars)

Latin America

(Total)

1963

1964

8,662

8,932

2,062

2,292
1,035

Mexico, Central America and
West Indies
Mexico

907

Argentina

768
465

883
994
788
520

448

460

829
1,132

Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Peru

Uruguay

—.*

—*

Venezuela
Other Countries

2,808

2,808

150

186

♦Included in '•Other Countries"

These direct Investments constitute a large proportion

of the Latin American economies, resulting in the subserviency
of these to the economy of the United States.

The degree

of this and the degree to which Latin Americans are divested
of the authority to control their own resources is clearly

indicated in the following passage by the author and
journalist John Gerassl:

Latin America's Gross National Product is about $60
billion.

United States private investments in Latin

America is slightly over $10 billion—on paper.
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These

investments control 40 per cent of Latin America's

Gross National Product, that is $24 billion—more

than all Latin American budgets put together.33
The significance here is that, to the extent to which
the United States' holdings control the Latin American

economies, Latin America has no other choice but to direct

her exports to the United States.

Moreover, when United

States' control of a particular industry is major, it follows

that price control is in other than Latin American hands.

A case in point is the Venezuelan oil industry.

According

to John Gerassi United States' companies control 73.84$

of the oil operations in that nation.

A 41.12$ alone is

controlled by the Creole Petroleum Corporation, which in

turn is 93.12$ owned by the Standard Oil Company.3^ Should
this company decide to diminish its operations in Venezuela,
in favor of its operations elsewhere, it could do so.

The

government of Venezuela would not have the power to bloc
such a decision, and the damage to its highly dependent

economy would be as real as it would be unavoidable.
The second aggravating factor for Latin American
economies is similar to the one just mentioned.

This

additional dependency factor is based on the very nature
of Latin American exports, admittedly no original fault
of the United States.

That is,

since the Latin American

economies are based on exports which are largely of raw

materials and foodstuffs rather than of manufactured goods,
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these exports are directly dependent upon the price fluctuations
of the world markets.

Table V shows not only the nature of

these exports but also to what extreme extent many nations

are sustained by a single product, which only increases the
actual and potential instability of their economies.

TABLE V

NATURE OF LATIN AMERICAN EXPORTS AND

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPORTS35
Country

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba

Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico

Nicaragua
Panama
Peru

Uruguay
Venezuela

Leading Export
Meat
Tin
Coffee

Copper
Coffee
Coffee

Sugar
Sugar
Bananas
Coffee
Coffee
Bananas
Cotton
Cotton
Bananas
Fishmeal
Wool
Petroleum

% of Total Exports

24$
73$
53$
66%
68$
50$
81$
56%
63$
48#

59£
41$
20$
40$
33$
20$
52$
92$

This table should sufficiently demonstate how a sudden

decrease in price on the world markets of a particular
export item may affect a nation so greatly dependent upon
that export item.

Ironically, the over-production of that

item within the exporting nation may be a major factor for a
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price decrease.

This has been the case with coffee, for

example, in the past.

The interdependency of the Latin American and North
American economies can further be demonstrated by showing

the percentage of Latin American imports arriving from the
United States compared to total imports.

Close to half of

Latin American imports do come from the United States, which
means that Latin America is a very significant market for

United States' manufactured products.

It also means that the

dependency of Latin America is proportionately increased
because of the double importance of the area to the United
States—as a supplier and as a market.

TABLE VI

EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO LATIN AMERICA36
(In Millions of Dollars)
1955

I960

1962

1963

1964

3,416

3,769

3,581

3,581

4,166

TABLE VII

IMPORTS OF LATINI AMERICA
FROM THE WORLD3?
AMERICA '
(In Millions of Dollars)
1956

1960

1962

1963

1964

7,930

8,350

8,780

8,710

9,540

The purpose here is not to analyze the Latin American
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economies per se.

The relevancy of the analysis, rather, is

seen when a comparison is made between the overall picture
of the Latin American economic situation—its structure and

its very close ties to the United States—and the Alliance

for Progress.

It seems rather evident that the crucial

predicament of Latin America is within its social and economic
structure and its subservient foreign relationships.

That

is, redistribution of power and wealth seems essential to
solve the social and economic imbalance of the area.

The

economic situation, as has been shown, is largely dependent
on the nature of her products and on the extensive control
over these from abroad.

The social structure within Latin America is such

that only a small proportion of the population enjoys the
benefits of each nation's economic activities.

Harvey

O'Connor estimates that in Venezuela only 10$ of the people
benefit from the oil earnings, whereas the rest of the

nation must struggle to exist.38

in Peru, much as elsewhere,

a very small and affluent minority maintains its condition

of privilege and wealth through ownership of the land.

In

other words, a minority of the populations enjoys high
standards of living, whereas the majority of the people live
at or below subsistence levels.

Maurice Halperin argues that

the majority of Latin Americans are actually experiencing
a decrease of income, rather than an increase.
40

He considers

the problematic social and economic structure to be directly
related to the dependency mentioned above:

The problems of land tenure and utilization, of basic
industrialization and external vulnerability are facets

of the larger problem:

the economic and political

ramifications of ,the region's controlling function

which is the export of raw materials under terms and

conditions determined outside the region.3"
Present inter-American relations are maintaining present

conditions.

To bring about a measure of social justice and

a more equal distribution of income, necessitates a drastic
change in the feudal-like structure of Latin America.

If

the population is to enter the economic and social picture
of each nation, they must be allowed to hold their share of

power and wealth.

The Alliance for Progress, with its

limited means, cannot radically alter the present structure,

in spite of its avowed purpose.

It was never meant to do so.

One of the immediate needs of Latin America is that
she be able to control her own resources and use them for

her own benefit.

Instead, much of her riches are drained

away from the area.

This situation is aggravated by the lack

of confidence of the Latin Americans in their own economies,

and the consequential flight abroad of much of Latin
America's own and badly needed capital.

The amount of

capital leaving Latin America cannot be measured accurately.
There are fears however, that it may equal the funds injected

by the Alliance in Latin America.40
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The Alliance for Progress is incapable of curing the

fundamental ills of Latin America.

Nor does it seem that the

United States be willing to do so.

A total reform of

social and economic structures would directly affect the
economic interests of the United States in the areas, as

well as of those groups which help to maintain the status

quo.

These are mainly the land owners, which have been

mentioned briefly, and the military to which we will refer
in the next section.

For example, land reform would mean to touch banana,

coffee, and sugar plantations,,in which the United States

holds major controlling interests in various nations.

To

allow local control and utilization of mining products,
would mean affecting United States' oil interests in

Venezuela and copper interests in Chile.

To allow nationali

zation of those investments would obviously mean higher
prices.

It is no secret that a real reform would result in the

nationalization of the mining operations and plantation

systems.

Carlos Fuentes, the Mexican novelist who was not

allowed to speak on American television, quotes a Peruvian

oligarch as saying:

"If the gringos force us to divide the

land, we will answer by expropriating their mining

companies."1*1 Realizing that the United States, and other
foreign investors for that matter, are not going to relinquish
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voluntarily their control and their benefits from the pre

sent relationships with Latin America, it becomes difficult

to imagine how the Alliance for Progress can accomplish the

program of change and progress called for by the Charter.
How can "self-sustaining growth" be achieved when the

present pattern of exploitation is not altered in favor of
the Latin Americans?

How can "social justice" be achieved

and a more "equitable distribution of national income"
obtained when the present power structure is not allowed to
be altered?

How can "rational industrialization" be

"accelerated" when no sufficient capital remains in Latin
America to even initiate the industrialization process?

The resulting impression is that the Alliance was not

designed for real unlimited growth and progress.

Rather, it

seems designed to maintain the state of Latin American
dependency and to retard the possible competition of an
industrialized and self-determined area.

The Alliance can

at best prevent the chronic and expanding problems of Latin
America to grow beyond control.
guaranteed.

And even that is not

Castro's revolution shows the impatience

fermenting in Latin America.

It is doubtful if the Alliance

is sufficient to avoid other Castros.

With the patterns and attitudes of the past persisting
into the present and seemingly into the future as well, it
seems unlikely that the Alliance for Progress can do peacefully
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what Castro unavoidably must do violently.

C.

The Peculiarity of Military Aid

There has never been a major war in Latin America,

with the exception of the struggles for independence from

Spain.

Nor could one be generated from within the area as

long as the supporting machinery is absolutely lacking, as

presently is the case.

Should Latin America be attacked

from without, the area would automatically be defended by

the United States, whose powerful military organization

provides a protective shield around the Western Hemisphere.
This defense is practically guaranteed since an outright and
direct attack from a foreign power upon a Latin American
nation is virtually an attack upon the well-being and the

security of the United States itself.

The United States has

gone to war for lesser provocations than a direct attack
on its own security.

Witness the involvement of the United

States in South Viet Nam where the "threat" to its security
is at least debatable.

For this reason there should be no

doubt that the United States would defend itself when
threatened in Latin America.

Yet, while this defensive capability and the willingness

to use it are present, the United States continues to send
military aid to the Latin Americans, who can hardly afford
or hardly need such aid.

The sending of military aid appears
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as a calculated effort to maintain the status quo in Latin

America, by sealing an alliance with the military power
groups there through aid, who in turn are supported by the

land owners.

Both these groups of course desire to maintain

the status quo as well, which benefits them, at the exclusion

of the lower classes which constitute the majority of the
population.

It is a known fact that military groups have traditionally

been conservative, and it is quite understandable that they
should oppose any attempts at reform since this would
endanger their own power bases.

What is not understandable

is how the Alliance can call for social reform (which would

dictate a diminishing of the power of the military groups

and of their control over national affairs), and, on the
other hand, how military aid is still being sent south in
direct support of those military groups who stand in the
way of reform!

The following statement, made by an official of the

Department of Defense should leave little doubt as to why
aid is provided to Latin American military establishments:
The strategic importance of Latin America to this
country cannot be over-estimated.
Latin America is a

major source of essential raw materials and a major
market for US products.

Its nations have been our

traditional allies in peace and war and their friendship
is necessary to effective US use of the Atlantic and

Pacific sea lanes in the event of any major hostilities.
The existence of hostile governments in Latin
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America would be a grave menace to the United States
should we become engaged in warfare on any considerable
scale anywhere in the world.
The denial to this country of the resources of the
area for any extended period would have grave con
sequences to the United States, both in the prosecution
of war and in recuperation from war damages.
Today, Latin American political, economic, and
social instability is a serious danger.
Cuba has shown
us what can happen.

The President's alliance for progress /sic7 was
conceived to meet these circumstances.

Extremists

both left and right can be counted upon to use every
means including subversion, terrorism, and civil war
to defeat the effort to bring the alliance for

progress /sic/ to fruition.
The role of the security forces in Latin America,
both police and military, therefore, assumes paramount

importance.

If the alliance for progress /sic7 is to

have its chance, governments must have the effective
force required to cope with subversion, prevent
terrorism, and deal with outbreaks of violence before
they reach unmanageable proportions.
They must be
able to sustain themselves against the attacks by the
international Communist organization and its indigenous

members.^
This statement is fairly typical of the attitude of
government officials, an attitude which can see and evaluate

Latin America only as a direct appendage to the United States,
This attitude, of course, is in direct contrast with the

concept supposedly embodied in the Alliance for Progress,
again supporting the view expounded in this paper.
John D. Powell, analyzing the relationship between
militarism in Latin America and military assistance provided
by the United States, notes that the majority of military
aid is in the form of outright grants, rather than loans.

Powell states that "the capacity of each member of the armed

46

forces to apply physical violence has been enhanced $X by
the U.S. military assistance program."

He adds that "it

is difficult to escape the conclusion that it /military aid/
is a contributory cause of militarism in Latin America.

Further, that the shift in emphasis from hemispheric security
to internal security capabilities will make the Latin

American military better trained and equipped than ever to
/—

_
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intervene in the political systems of their nations /sic/."
Powell deplores this because he feels that military inter
ventions only weaken the political process and become an
obstacle to social reform in the name of "political stability."

Here again, the Alliance per force clashes with the

Military Assistance Program as it does with other special
interest groups on both sides of the "border."

The ultimate

goals of the Alliance and of the Military Assistance Program
are in direct opposition to each other.

Yet military aid has

not diminished since the advent of the Alliance for Progress.

D.

No Intent to Reform behind the
Alliance for Progress

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how the
Alliance for Progress cannot avoid failing to accomplish its

objectives.

Since the problems of Latin America and the

particular relationship of the area to the United States were
known before the creation of the program, it is clearly
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implied here that the Alliance for Progress was not meant
to bring social and economic revolutions to Latin America.
The obvious contradiction and ambiguity contained in
the following statement by the veteran foreign service officer

John M. Cabot, proves the point:

"Whereas our policy seeks

to promote reform and social justice /sic/ in Latin America,
the need to protect our large economic stake inevitably

injects a conservative note into our policies."^
Many observers from Latin America are much more explicit
in their evaluation of the Alliance.

The Mexican author

and critic Luis Cardoza y Aragon writes:

"The Alliance for

Progress is a form of neocolonialism, to deter the anti-

imperialistic revolution in Spanish America."^5 Leopoldo
Zea, a professor in philosophy and author, also from Mexico,

observing the United States' military intervention in the
Dominican Republic, writes:

"To lift up, to stimulate these

nations of Latin America will mean broader opportunities for

economic development within the United States itself."^"
A harsher indictment comes from Edmundo Flores, a
Mexican and a

member of the American Technical Aid Mission

to Bolivia, who sees the Alliance as a conservative element

rather than as progressive one.

He states:

"The Alliance

was not created to realize effective, structural, irreversable

reforms.

Its purpose was exactly the contrary, that is to

introduce technological and administrative improvements to
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avoid fundamental changes."^?
The list of criticism could go on; there is enough

to draw upon.

More important than the amount, however, is

that the writers do not see the Alliance for what it claims

to be.

They see the Alliance as a tool of the United States

with which to continue a situation which is profitable to it.
Ironically enough, or perhaps the word should be
tragically so, that very same program is for some too much
to bear for very different reasons.

The editors of Business

Week state the case as follows:

Another disquieting prospective is the adverse impact
on private investment that can be expected from the
Administration's policy of actively sponsoring social
reform in the emerging nations . . . Social reform, if
pushed too fast, is sure to lead to higher tax rates
and wage rates, and often to outright harassment of

businesses.^8
Thus, whereas on one side the Alliance is accused of

being protective of foreign investments and interests, on
the other it is seen as dangerous in that it may initiate

social reform and economic justice.

To these people the

"pursuit of happiness" apparently applies to only a limited
number.

The Alliance for Progress, then, operating in the
presence of conflicting economic interests, unsupported by
parallel programs to eliminate the conflicting factors, and

restricted by the political pressures which keep Latin America
in a subservient position cannot be, nor is it in actuality,
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a program of reform.

American policies.

It is a continuation of past inter-

It is dictated by limited and short-range

outlooks and by the fear of having a competitor next door

rather than a client.

It disregards the feelings and the

rights of the Latin Americans; it refuses to comprehend their
peculiar situation and their frustrated hopes for dignity
and self-affirmation.

As the Alliance helps to maintain the present pattern
of servility, rather than to bring about progress and
justice, it may well be one of the causes for the disturbances

to come.

The Alliance for Progress, for its very nature and

duplicity, in spite of possible good intentions, is a failure
of the foreign policy of the United States.
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CHAPTER IV

LATIN AMERICA TODAY:

A

DEFEATED CONTINENT

The Wars of Independence of the early l800's were
very significant for Latin America.

After 300 years of

colonial status, Latin America gained political and economic

independence from Spain and from Brazil.

The ties that kept

the region servant to the Crown were broken.

There existed

now the possibility to build nations from colonies, to

evolve from colonial dependencies to self-governing social,
economic and political units.

Today, after almost a century and a half, one wonders
if nations were built since that time in Latin America.

quick survey of the area is far from encouraging.
deficiencies in almost every field of activity:

A

It reveals
in distri

bution of income, education, sanitation, urban development,
and agriculture, to name but a few.

It shows shortcomings

and excesses, lack of capability to lack of willingness, and
lack of results.

In other words, the picture is one of

imbalance, of contrasts and of extremes.

Considering the

years gone by since the birth of the republics it seems
reasonable and unavoidable to ask why this deplorable
situation persists today, and why it seems so difficult to
alter and improve this situation.

The problem which Latin America is today seems to have
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been caused mainly by two reasons.

One is inherent to the

area and its people and is actually a complex of factors;
the other is external to the area and has become operative
only in more recent years.

The present chapter will outline these factors and the
resulting consequences with which the Alliance for Progress
is faced and which constitute a barrier to its success.

A.

The Spanish Inheritance

Spain occupied and exploited Latin America for more
than 300 years.

During this time, the role of Latin America

was to supply Spain with the products it had to offer so

that Spain could forge and occupy its place in the European

arena of competing powers.

(Much of this and the following

applies also to Brazil in relation to Portugal.)
Remembering that Spain stumbled upon Latin America

and that Spain was not prepared to organize and direct so

vast an empire, it is surprising that the empire lasted as
long as it did.

If it managed to last so long, it was able

to do so primarily because of the degree of authority and
severity used by Spain in ruling the colonies.

Legislative

and most administrative authority remained in the hands of

the Crown which dictated the policies, rules and regulations
for the Latin American dependencies.
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No degree of autonomy

was permitted or exercised in the colonies, except on an

illegal basis or at the lower local level.

The Church was

used by the Crown to re-enforce and "legalize" Spain's

presence in the New World and to assure the continuation of
the highly profitable relationship between the colonies and
the mother country.

The social structure of Spain, rigid and austere in

its divisions, was brought to Latin America from Spain as
another device to maintain the channels of power under the
control of the monarchy residing across the Atlantic.

Equality, government by representation and other such liberal
concepts were never a part of Latin America's colonial
experience.

The significance of all this is that Latin America, on
the eve of Independence, was totally unprepared for conscious

self-government and for the responsibility imposed upon it

by the bravely gained freedom.

(In some of the colonies it

is at least doubtful, however, whether freedom was actually

being sought.

It seems that it came to them by accident

more than by design, as was the case in Bolivia.)
Latin America in the 1820»s completely lacked the

necessary economic and political infrastructure to evolve into

a stable and progressive family of nations.

Spain had

deprived Latin America not only of the necessary self-functioning
governmental structure, but also of self-consciousness, of
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self-identity and of a path, a vision of the future.
result was confusion and uncertainty.

The

Conflicts arose between

the factions expousing federalism and the factions expousing

centralism, between those calling for a new monarchy and
those favoring some form of representative government.

The

first few years of Independence saw a variety of experiments
in nation building, none, however, capable of bringing

tranquility and discipline to the troubled new nations.
This state of affairs encouraged the heads of the

military to exercise the needed leadership of the various

civilian governments.

These military leaders represented

the only fairly stable force in Latin America.

They had

the support of the armies, loyal to them personally more
than to an institution or a concept such as democracy.

They

were also aided by the traditional respect for authority

by power.

Even today the respect for law in its angle-saxon

understanding is not a strong point of the Spanish character.
The uncontested position of the early leaders, coupled

perhaps by the Latin American admiration, for machismo, was
the beginning of a long series of caudlllos, dictators
and military juntas.

Caudillismo, and regionalism as well, is still present

in Latin America today.

So is much of the original inheritance

from Spain, Including an almost feudal social structure with
all its inequalities, and the reluctance or the incapability
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on the part of the people, due to lack of training, to assume

the responsibility of governing, of making laws and of
obeying them.

This inheritance from a time passed, rigidly maintained

in a changing world, undeniably has contributed to the

instability and to the lack of progressive elements in modernday Latin America.

The peculiar riches of Latin America further contributed
in creating the problems being witnessed today.

There are

a variety of products in the area, but not within any one
nation.

This situation of unbalanced resources is aggravated

by the failure to industrialize before or after Independence,
which in turn restricted the potential trade within the area.
The monoculture and the nature of the raw-materials

of Latin America, and the resulting economic difficulties,

have already been noted in this paper.

Rather than repeating

them, it should suffice to say that the economic instability
and insecurity has continuously hampered the development of

political stability.

Moreover, the failure to develop

economically and to gain self-sufficiency in time became
the invitation which attracted and facilitated the coming

of the foreign investor on the Latin American scene.

B.

The Presence of the Foreigner

The degree of foreign control—economic, political and
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occasionally military—has been discussed in the previous

chapter and need not be repeated here.

However, it is

necessary to emphasize at this time that the state of

dependency is related to the state of instability so char
acteristic of Latin America.

The foreign investor, having considerable political
influence due to his economic control over local resources,

is usually "allied" to the local elite groups.

Both share

the same interests in maintaining the status quo in Latin

America.

The dominant classes, composed of the owners of

large estates and plantations, the owners of mines and of
the related processing industries, the military and to some
extent the" Church, have a vested interest in the situation
as it stands.

To introduce liberal and progressive legislation,

and especially to enforce such legislation, would be
detrimental to their privileged position, and of course their

income.

Strong unions, wage-increases, taxation and the like,

irritate the elite as much as the foreign investor.

These,

then, form a conservative force, ready to block or defeat
any progressive force which would alter their present social
structure and the economic framework to which it is directly
related.

The efforts by these conservative elements to

preserve the present profitable economic and social situation
results in the political instability often disturbing the
Latin American scene.

Coups d'etat are mainly a function of
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this effort, and the usual purpose of these is to replace a
too liberal and daring government with a more "traditional"

one, that is, one which will protect the status of the groups

in power, including the interests of the foreign investor.
As a result of this, respect for governmental procedures,

and long-range economic planning cannot be obtained in an
environment where such respect is not exercised by the very

dominant economic and political elements in the area:

the

elite and the foreign investor supported by his government.

Respect for law cannot be obtained where the law is
altered or interpreted according to the needs of the moment.
Dictators are in the habit of suspending constitutional

rights at a moment's notice, in complete disregard for the
spirit of the law.

The governments protecting the foreign

investor have officially recognized and thus supported many
a dictator in Latin America.

Trujillo in the Dominican

Republic and Batista in Cuba are two famous examples of such
recognition and support by the United States.

Social justice cannot be obtained within a class structure
favoring the few at the expense of the many, within a class
structure which is being maintained, as has been indicated

previously, in order to maintain the profitable situation
derived from it.

Hope in the future cannot be had in a situation which
denies the reality of today and disregards the seriousness
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of that reality.

The foreign investor, allied to the power

groups of Latin America, helps to maintain those conditions
and to that extent is responsible for them.

C.

The Alliance for Progress in the
Context of Today's Latin America

The history of Latin America caused the region to be

unprepared for nationhood when Independence was finally
achieved.

The condition of unpreparedness has been continued

by the misuse of the area's resources by local and foreign

commercial enterprises.

The result today is that the

Alliance for Progress cannot operate in a climate of

cooperation and trust.
there.

The cooperation and trust are not

Years of abuse and the nature of the Alliance itself

impede any probability of success for the program.
Local initiative has long been discouraged by the

apparent futility to engage in anything progressive.

Such

attempts are usually blocked in time by the local conservative

elements and by the traditional opposition to reform and
progress too often typified by the fgta^ementx of the editors
of Business Week mentioned earlier.

The Alliance for Progress is to the Latin Americans

but one more act of patronage, one more appeal to patience,
one more request to let the democratic process solve the
problems afflicting them.

But to the Latin Americans democracy

by now means capitalism, and to them capitalism means
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exploitation.

GaplitaClilSHi' is the system of the foreigner

and is equated with economic oppression and the social in
justice it embodies.
Friction, distrust and alienation are part of the
obstacles the Alliance faces in the field.

In view of past

and present history, this is understandable.

But more

important than this, it is regrettable that the Alliance
represents a continuation of policies dictated by short
sightedness and immediate self-interest.

It is all the more

regrettable because these policies emerge from an otherwise
great nation, a nation which has been and hopefully still is

capable of broadmindedness and generosity.

The United States

has been to many a symbol of freedom and growth, a concrete

proof that progress, given the minimum conditions necessary,

can be obtained.

The United States is a living example that

hope and sacrifice can be meaningful, and that these can,

even though admitting the exceptions still to be solved, bring
about those standards and those conditions which are basic

to the dignity and to the integrity of man.
Knowing the capabilities of the United States, it is

highly disappointing that such a nation should not be willing
to seek more realistic and more sincere solutions to a problem
which does concern it, a problem which should never be con
sidered impossible to solve, as some would have it.
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CHAPTER V
OF THE NECESSITY FOR CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDE
OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

This paper has attempted to demonstrate from various
perspectives that the Alliance for Progress does not have
the capability to cope with the problems of Latin America.
Even admitting that the Alliance includes some well intended
efforts,

the conclusion that it is a device to maintain

a state of continuing dependency can hardly be avoided.
Having arrived this far,

their remains now the need to point

out some of the realities operating in the field of inter-

American relations and the error of continuing such policies
which ultimately will be detrimental to the United States
as well as to Latin America.

This chapter will offer some suggestions in line with

the realities of the Latin American situation, suggestions
which are believed to be in the interest of both Latin

America and the United States.

They are offered in the

belief that the continuation of present policies will lead
to further negative, if not destructive, results and on the

assumption that it is preferable to avoid these and to favor,
instead, such processes which will direct the energies of

this continent towards positive, constructive and mutually
beneficiall relations.
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A.

Latin America:

The Reality of the Present

Latin America needs extensive change if it is to

develop in any significant way.

It seems also safe to say

that Latin America wants change and that its people will

labor and struggle to obtain the change which will lead to

improved conditions.

The example of Mexico, while not

completely successful, still indicates that there is both
the capability and the willingness for change in Latin
America.

Unfortunately, the past sttitudes and policies of the
United States have not reflected a real understanding of

Latin America's plight nor an appreciation of the desire
for change.

Presently, the Alliance for Progress is not a

reversal of United States' policy, as this paper has

attempted to show, and therefore the Alliance program does
not recognize the full extent of the Latin American impasse.

Yet, the Latin American problem is there.

The potential

threat of grave disturbances to come is visible in the

signs of unrest breaking through the apparent curtain of

passivity and resignation.

Guerilla activities here and there

indicate that unrest is fermenting.

Frequent student

demonstrations reflect the demand for action and the

impatience for results which now are nowhere to be seen.
than these, Castro's Cuba clearly demonstrates the degree
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More

of desperation being reached under the present systems
of government and the conditions afflicting the people.
Cuba indicates the willingness of the people to force their

way out—violently if necessary—to obtain the justice that
has been denied themI

These are signs of a reality which the minority groups
of Latin America and the United States as a

recognize.

nation refuse

to

In the face of even only the potential damage to

the economic interests of the United States, it is foolish
to do so.

In the face of those results—violence and

further unavoidable injustice—which present conditions are

bound to produce, such refusal is irresponsible.
Some will argue that Castro-type revolutions are not
the wave of the future of Latin America.

They point out

that the masses of Latin America do not have the political
consciousness, the organizational discipline or the actual
means to successfully carry out a revolution.

If this is

the case, and it cannot be totally refuted, there remains

the problem of small but impatient groups of dissenters and
ardent reformers.

These individuals cannot find the means

to express or to develop their aspirations for change and
renewal within the fixed structures of their nations.

Thus,

out of frustration and with a vague hope of success through
extra-legal means,

they carry their activities to the hills.
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Such guerilla groups have been noticeably active in Peru,
Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras
and Brazil.

If these groups do not have a reasonable chance

of success, they will persist in a series of futile and painful
acts of sabotage and terrorism, distorting their own efforts

in the process.

Motivated and angered by their frustration

they will continue on a road of disruptiveness which will
only increase the efforts to oppress them.

On the other

hand, increased persecution tends to increase resistance to
it, and thus to increase the cost of the struggle on both
sides.

But this oppression may cause the persecuted to become
martyrs of their ideals and thus enhance the probability of

success as the people extend to them their sympathy and
support.

Should this happen, and should they come to power,

the revolutionaries may well initiate a new wave of regimentation
and harsh treatment to eliminate their former oppressors.

This too is a reality of Latin America.

This too should be

avoided.

Latin America, as a neighboring supplier and market, and

as an entity of people, of human beings, concerns the United
States very much.

To avoid facing the problem and to refuse

to deal with it in a realistic and meaningful manner is but

to accelerate the tempo of the coming crisis, whether it be

a relatively quick and effective revolution, or whether it be a
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long, disruptive and corrosive movement of underground
subversive activities.

The United States could engage in a

constructive role in Latin America.

It seems absurd that

the- path to defeat is being followed instead.
B.

The Obligation to Help

There are both moral and practical reasons which

compel the bigger nation to help the smaller.

The actual

process of help, however, demands a willingness to look
honestly at the problems facing the area, to admit the negative
effects from narrowly conceived policies, and to recognize

the availability, the feasibility and the desirability of
alternate modes of conduct.

The moral argument is based on a concept of universal

justice which asserts that every human being is entitled to
a fair share of the riches of the world and to that dignity

befitting the status of man.

It is based on the concept of

man's equality, on the concept that no man has the right to
enslave his fellow-man.

The indignity imposed on the oppressed is cast back

upon the oppressor.

A United States calling itself

"enlightened," only contradicts itself in pursuing a policy
refuted by its own creed.

To maintain such policies may

well erode the fiber, attack the integrity, and produce a
cynicism inconsistent with the values upon which the United
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States has been built.

All this is not to argue that the United States should

suddenly retire completely from Latin America.
obviously be naive.
be reckoned with.

This would

The cold reality of economics must still
The suggestion here is that within the

confines of political and economic realism steps can be taken
in the direction of mutually beneficial inter-American
relations which are based on objective evaluations of present
conditions and the destructive effects resulting from them.

The practical argument is presented by the known
historian Arnold J. Toynbee, in a Weatherhead Lecture delivered

in Puerto Rico early in 1962.

He points out that revolutionary

movements are "... the only movements in the world which

offer to us a hope that our decision might be to save us from
suicide for a life in the future in which all of us would

constitute a single family."^9 The reference, of course, is
to mass suicide made possibly by the physical means for
total destruction now available to man.

Arturo Melendez

Lopez, reviewing Toynbee»s theory in relation to the Alliance
for Progress and pointing out that Toynbee himself states that
to live in a family implies the realization of social justice,
concludes:

"Either the world realizes social justice or it

destroys itself."50

That is to say, failure to bring about

social justice may provide the catalyst needed to bring

about the alternate possibility, which is man's self-destruction.
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Latin America is the neighbor of the United States.
No one can argue that peaceful relations with the area are

undesirable.

To allow the full development of Latin America

would be right and just in and of itself.

But even from a

position of strict self-interest, this would be profitable
to the United

States.

The presence of a competitive

producer would also mean the presence of a market having
the buying power which could increase economic activities

within the United States.

Looking back at Western Europe

as an example of a producer and a market, it is at least

debatable that an industrialized and competitive Latin
America would be damaging to the economy of the United States.
C.

The Search for Progress in Latin America

There has been sufficient contact between Latin America
generally and foreign elements to create an awareness of

better conditions elsewhere in the world.

The peasant or

the Indian, who is most probably ignorant of the larger
world around him, merely wants the means of subsistence which

compared to his modest demands are still inadequate.

But

the middle groups, those who are aware of the outside world

and of higher standards of living, are asking for the pro

ducts of modern technology, products which are presently
beyond their reach.

Together the people of Latin America are asking and
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demanding that they be allowed to obtain that which is
essential to satisfy their needs as human beings.
economic and otherwise, is desired by all.

Progress,

How this progress

is to be achieved depends greatly on how the area will be

dealt with by the more powerful and richer nations of the
world and by the leadership groups in Latin America.
Since the desire for progress is operative among the

Latin Americans, it seems that the search for progress will
have to be carried out somehow.

If the search is denied to

them by peaceful means, they may well be forced to follow a

path of violence, however painful that may be.

Frustration

and desperation can be powerful motives for action.

These

actions may not necessarily be rational or follow intelligent

plans; they will probably be impulsive and even become selfdefeating at times.

The point to be considered and recognized

is that once the forces aspiring for change are in motion,

they are difficult to stop or to control, except perhaps

by outright military intervention.

A movement which can

gather the support and the enthusiasm of the people will go
to great lengths to obtain the goals it has set for itself.
These energies, however, could be channeled before

they are pressed into a course of force and harshness.

They

could be channeled to avoid the high price demanded by a

revolution and the inevitable injustices it carries with it.
But a vision is needed to do this.
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The pressure of progress

must be accompanied by a reasonable assurance that it can be

obtained peacefully and that its rewards will be distributed
in such a way that the people can participate in the process
with a sense of purpose and expectation.

The United States, with the resources at its disposal,
could aid in this process of change and progress.

By

fulfilling a constructive role the United States could gain
the active support of the Latin Americans, economic and

political support which would stimulate the economy of the
United States along with that of Latin America.

Moreover,

the United States would then also deserve to be called

"enlightened."

D.

A Plan for the Future

A child must be provided with the means necessary for

its growth.

It needs food, drink, protection and guidance.

However, the child must do its own growing, its body must
accomplish the process which will bring it to maturity.
Someone else cannot do the growing for the child.

Along the

same lines, no one can actually direct the growth of the

child in a specific direction; no one can force the child
to grow with this quality or with that attribute.
is there.

The matrix

At most, the process may be retarded or distorted

through interference which could diminish the physical or the
psychological growth of the child.
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Similarly, to impose

certain conditions on a child and to expect it to fulfill

these, prior to allowing it to receive the food it needs,
would be cruel and unrealistic.

To deny the child the food

it cannot provide on its own would be inhuman but also
self-defeating.

The resulting retarded or crippled child

would be a misfit, a weakling dependent upon others and thus

a weight rather than a useful contributor to his society.
A nation is much like a child.

It too needs "food,"

and the nation too must do its own "growing," forge its own

character and provide Itself with the temper needed to achieve

maturity and responsibility.

When a nation has been deprived

of the "food" essential to its growth and when it has been

hampered in the development of its maturity by outside
elements, it is unrealistic to expect it to fulfill certain

conditions imposed upon it from abroad.

This is especially

true when the conditions are alien to its nature and contrary
to its character.

Latin America has been deprived of the resources—its

food—needed for its growth.

It has not been allowed to go

through the training process necessary to arrive at levels
of maturity and necessary to acquire concepts of responsibility.
In both pre- and post-colonial times Latin America has been
denied the opportunity to grow, retarded by outside inter
ference, by its own environment and generally by its own
leaders.
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Today, Latin America still suffers from the crippling
effects of the past, a past which continues into the present.
If Latin America will somehow attempt to develop and

obtain the progress now wanting, it seems logical that Latin
America will follow that avenue along which progress is

possible.
route.

If one route is blocked, it will try an alternate

If the desirable route, the peaceful one within a

constitutional framework, is not open to Latin America, the

alternate route, more or less violent, seems unavoidable.

Change by violence demands its price from those involved

in the process of obtaining it.

Avoiding the suffering and

the sacrifice seems obviously desirable and should be possible,

It could be possible, given the understanding of present
reality by those responsible for it.

Projecting the present

deplorable conditions into the future at rates of increase

paralleling the estimated increases of population, and recog
nizing the potential danger of total revolutions and their

consequences, it seems rather imperative that the peaceful
route of change and progress be kept open and be made
available where non-existent.

Keeping this in mind, the following suggestions are
offered in the belief that violence

can be avoided and that

the policies based on the suggestions will be advantageous
to both North and Latin America.
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1.

Latin America must be allowed control, use and gain

from its own resources.

basic to its growth.

Latin America must have the "food"

This obviously implies the relinquishing

by foreign nationals of their control and investments.
However, this must be accomplished on a gradual basis, since
a sudden severance would produce chaos and a diminishing of

output.

An effort to make reasonable but low payments for

expropriated properties would force fiscal responsibility
upon Latin Americans and at the same time preserve the needed

respect and friendly attitude of the foreign nations involved.
2.

Technical and financial aid, upon request, should

be extended to Latin America.

Presently much of the Latin

American economy is directed and operated by foreign technicians.
To displace these technicians would cause the collapse of many
industries.

Efforts should be made

to train local technicians

who could then replace the ones presently employed, and in
turn teach others to continue the process.

Financial aid

should be granted until the capability of capital-saving has
been reached.

This is essential in the creating of a self-

sustaining capacity to grow and to develop.

3.

Agriculture obviously must be encouraged to provide

for a growing population.

A sufficient food supply is the

foundation of any viable economy.

Modernization of agricultural

methods, fertilization, irrigation, soil conservation and
crop diversification are badly needed in all of Latin America.
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Funds and technical assistance should be channeled to this

sector.

A tract of land is not sufficient to create a farmer

out of a landless peasant; he still needs the tools and the

initial credit to become efficient and to produce a surplus.
Sufficiency in the production of food stuffs would free

considerable amounts of capital now used to import food
products from abroad.

This capital could then be diverted

and invested within the economy and thus supply added
incentive.

4.

Diversification of economic activity should be

encouraged.

Essential is the initiation of basic manufacturing

industries to provide the tools needed in the industrial and

other sectors of the economy.

This is a key factor in

eliminating the chronic state of dependency of Latin America
from foreign industrial producers.

5.

Education should be provided to the people of Latin

America, especially in those areas and at those levels which

would most contribute to local self-sufficiency.

Secondary

and technical schools have been long neglected when they
should be high on the priority list.

The opportunity of

education is by itself one of the main stimulating factors
in the building of a nation by the nation's own people.

6.

Military aid must be suspended to reduce the

controlling and interfering power of the various armies.

The diminished role of the military groups would facilitate
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the political process and increase the chances of political
stability.

Internal stability in turn would provide the

process of growth, the freedom it needs and would increase
the feeling of confidence by national and foreigners alike
in the governments of the various nations.

7.

Internal political disputes should not be inter

fered with from abroad by either direct or indirect inter
ventions.

In other words, the sovereignty of the Latin

American nations should be respected.

This would help in

fixing the responsibility of political and economic activities

upon the Latin Americans themselves and give them that sense
of pride and cooperation needed in the effort of developing
and achieving progress.

Democracy, as a political system, should not be imposed
on or expected to develop in Latin America as a sine qua non
for aid or recognition.
most Latin Americans.

Democracy is an alien concept to
The more educated consider democracy

unfeasible and impossible of success, as many experiments

have shown.

Thus, if a nationalistic or a socialistic

movement should be active in Latin America, it should not be

opposed from abroad on the sole basis of being different,
non-democratic or non-capitalistic.

Such political and

economic systems are not by their nature inimical to outsiders,
as is too readily believed.

It would also be more realistic

and useful not to equate nationalism with Communism, two
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very different notions.

Local demonstrations of discontent,

movements of liberalization and generally disturbing activities

should not be readily labeled Communist inspired or supported,
nor should they automatically be defined as Communist

attempts to take over a government and place it under the
control of Moscow.

More often than not they are an expression

of local grievances and an attempt, however unsuccessful
they may be,

to correct the imbalance of social and economic

conditions.

Should both Communism and nationalism be present

it is not predetermined that Communism will prevail.
nationalism and communism collide,

"Where

it is communism that

loses, and nationalism that wins."^1

This, of course, should

be understood in terms of a specific ideology versus the
national interest.

In a direct confrontation it is unlikely

that the national interest be sacrificed for the ideology.
The recent developments in Indonesia and the revival of
nationalism in some of the satellite countries of Eastern

Europe illustrate the lasting value centrality of nationalism.
Russia's decision not to press the Cuban missile case in the

face of United States' hostility indicates the priority given
to national interest over ideology.
8.

Financial and technical aid should be extended

through a non-United States agency.

This would remove the

long standing stigma of economic imperialism connected with

aid coming directly from the United States.
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Moreover, it

would remove the temptation to control and manipulate, on
the part of the United States, the aid funds for political

reasons, and thus remove a cause behind the lack of cooperation
on the part of the Latin Americans.

The United Nations

would serve a better function here than, say, the Organization
of American States.

This world-wide organization has a more

neutral image, and can expect a more substantial response
than the one tinted by shades of subserviency to the dominant
economic interests.

Aid funds, during at least the initial period, should
be extended as outright grants rather than loans.

This would

provide Latin America with the initial capital needed to
start a capital saving process which ultimately would lead to

capabilities of self-growth and self-sufficiency.

These measures alone, it is realized, would not solve

the problems of Latin America.

As suggested earlier, the

"child" must still do its own "growing."

This involves above

all the acceptance of political and social responsibility
on the part of the Latin Americans.

In reference to this

particular problem, it seems that the removal of foreign
control over local resources will also remove a psychological
crutch which ao far has impeded the formation of political
and economic responsibility.

There is a tendency in Latin

America to blame the local ills on the foreign investor, whose
presence in a sense also legitimizes the local power structure
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and the various regimes alternating themselves in power.
The absence of foreign control and the turning over of the
local resources and industries to local elements fixes the

responsibility of success and growth on the Latin Americans

themselves.

This would be a strong factor inducing the

maximization of these resources and the most useful employment
of the gains derived from them.

There still remains the aspect of the traditional oli
garchical forces in Latin America.

This factor cannot be

easily altered or adapted to new forms since it is rooted in

years and years of privileged status.

The higher classes

will not easily or voluntarily renounce their position.

It

seems reasonable to state, however, that there is at least

the possibility of peacefully altering the present power
structure.

The pressing demands of a steadily increasing

population offers the top echelons a choice:

either resist

stubbornly or compromise and share both political and economic
power.

Efforts by landless peasants to occupy and cultivate

land owned by wealthy proprietors have been common. So far

the peasants have been forced off the land or held at bay

by promises of agrarian reforms.*

If the proprietors recog

nize the possibility of losing their lands, as has happened
in Cuba, they may probably reason and compromise.
The complete transfer of responsibility, in terms of

national growth or stagnancy, from foreign to national elements,
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will fall at least in part on the traditional holders of

power.

That is, the pressure of the nation's doing or undoing

will focus on and affect the local power groups to the extent
that no foreign "scape-goat" is available.

Another possible factor demanding change in the power
structure may be coming from the workers and employees
forming the in-between groups, that is those who are neither
members of the lower, impotent classes, nor members of those

classes where power now resides.

Whereas it may be too early

to speak of these as a middle class, due mainly to lack of

numbers, it still seems probable that they may apply additional
pressure for a redistribution of power and authority.
The hope that the latifundistas, the mine-owners and

others who so far have enjoyed and preserved the benefits of

their status, the hope that these will be able or willing
to accept their share of responsibility is, of course, not

assured.

Far from it.

But this hope has a possible basis

in a phenomenon which has been developing in Latin America
for a number of years.

This phenomenon is the search of

identity by the Latin Americans.

After gaining independence

from Spain and Portugal, it became difficult if not absurd

to identify with that nation against which they had rebelled

and by which they had been kept in a state of bondage.

While

it was relatively easy to negate the ties with Europe, it
was not so easy to find a substitute with which to identify.
77

An original and local culture had not yet been developed by
the Creole element.

Everything produced by or related to

the Indian was scorned and judged inferior to the dignity
and consideration of the "criollo."

In more recent years, however, the Latin American has

come to recognize the beauty and value of what is authentically
Latin American.

There is a growing pride and identification

with what is Latin American proper, with what is native,

including especially the Indian heritage.

This newly found

identity and the expression of it can be seen especially in
the artistic activities of the Latin Americans.

In the field

of the novel a great number of works have been written lately
based on and in defense of the Indian and of Indian culture.
In Peru, for example, Ciro Alegrla's El mundo es ancho y

a.jeno is typical of the current.

In Bolivia Alcides Arguedas'

La raza de bronce is representative of the same tendency
to *H$rvatte3 the Indian to his rightful place within the national
character.

In the field of painting the works of the Mexican

Diego Rivera and his use of native themes are well-known.

Incaic themes are ^distinguishable in the modern painting
of Carlos Aitor Castillo from Peru.

The famous mosaics of

the University of Mexico reflect the same awareness of the

indigenous inheritance and the growing recognition of this

value and of its meaning to the people who live and hope
in Latin America.
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These are signs justifying a reliance on the Latin

Americans' own sense of identity and of purpose.

They are

signs indicating the presence of positive and responsible
forces in an area which for many years considered itself the

inferior child of a splendid mother country.

A vision of progress and of growth may realistically
be built upon those forces which find their strength in their
own nation, especially if they can call these their own.

Given the necessary help and a climate of cooperation and
understanding from abroad, there is a fair chance of success
in Latin America.
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CONCLUSION

This paper questioned the nature and the motivation of
the Alliance for Progress as an aid program of the United

States to Latin America.

By presenting relevant data and

by evaluating the program in the light of its intended

purpose, it has been shown that it is quite insufficient
to obtain the goals stated in the Charter of the Alliance

for Progress.

To the contrary, it has been shown that,

because of its very limitations and because of the context

within which the program operates, the Alliance for Progress
is actually very similar to and quite typical of the past
attitudes and relations of the United States towards Latin

America.

A condition of dependency on the part of Latin America
has been its main feature in relation to the United States.

The Alliance for Progress does not alter this condition of

dependency.

In view of the nature of the relationship

between the United States and Latin America it cannot do

so, and, therefore, it does not represent a new direction
or a new approach of the foreign policy of the United States.

A nation, in order to maintain its greatness and its
position of leadership, must be able to view and deal with

the matters facing it in an intelligent and responsible
manner, respecting the realities of the times and the
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possible developments in the future.

Considering the ill-

effects to be had by continuing the present relationship
with Latin America, and considering the capability, the

energy and the vitality of the United States in practically

every field, the case of Latin America could be a stimulating
challenge to the United States as a nation.

If this

challenge were to be recognized and accepted, there Is every
probability that the United States would gain from the very
incentives provided by the challenge.

The gain would not be

limited to a feeling of "righteousness in being generous to
a neighbor; it would also be very concrete in economic and
political terms.

The intellectual and material resources, the educational
and research facilities, the industrial and commerical

elements, the technical and planning know-how, and even the
relevant political institutions of the United States could

find a purpose and a gain in the cooperative development of
Latin America.

of giving.

The process of help would not consist only

It would be more aistsuipa-tee to see it as investing

in the future of both Latin America and the United States,
as the building of the foundations on which inter-American

relations could rest, be of mutual benefit, and certainly be
more fruitful than they presently are.

The United States has a choice before it.

The pragmatic

and moral obligation viewpoints call for a drastic and immediate
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change of United States' policy.

Otherwise, this nation

must be prepared to accept the consequences of the upheaval
now brewing in Latin America.
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